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The Queen v Getachew:
Rethinking DPP v Morgan
Kenneth J. Arenson*
Abstract In The Queen v Getachew, a recent decision of the High Court of
Australia that was soon followed by the Victorian Court of Appeal, the
High Court correctly noted that there is a fine line between the mens reas
of belief and knowledge which turns upon the degree of conviction with
which a belief is held. In particular, the court emphasised that a belief in
the existence of a fact or circumstance that contemplates a real possibility
or perhaps a higher degree of doubt as to the existence of that fact or
circumstance is tantamount to knowledge or awareness that such fact or
circumstance may not exist. When applied to the principle enunciated in
DPP v Morgan, that type of belief would not be mutually exclusive with the
alternative mens reas that require the Crown to prove that the accused was
aware that the complainant was not or might not be consenting to the
penetration at issue. In Getachew, the High Court merely pointed out that
the mens reas of knowledge and belief, though similar in certain respects,
are separate and distinct mental states that were incorrectly and inexplic-
ably treated as though they were identical in Morgan and innumerable
decisions that have followed and relied upon Morgan since it was decided
by the House of Lords in 1976. In the aftermath of Getachew, therefore, the
principle that an accused can act with a mental state that is mutually
exclusive of the mens rea for rape remains intact. What has changed is that
it is knowledge, rather than a mere belief that the complainant is not or
might not be consenting, that is mutually exclusive of the requisite mens
rea for rape. 
Keywords Rape; Mens rea for rape at common law and statutory
offences of rape; Distinction between knowledge/awareness and
belief
The Crimes Amendment (Rape) Act 2007 (Vic) affected significant
changes to the law of rape in Victoria, most notably the inclusion of
what the High Court referred to as a new ‘fault element’1 of Victoria’s
statutory crime of rape,2 a revised version of s. 37 and the addition of ss
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1 The Queen v Getachew [2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196 at [27] (French CJ,
Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). Section 38(2)(a)(i)–(ii) and (4)(a)(i)–(ii) of
the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provide that in order to be convicted under s. 38(2)(a)
and (4), the prosecution must prove that the accused was aware that the
complainant was not or might not have been consenting or, alternatively, that the
non-consensual sexual penetration occurred without the accused having given
‘any thought to whether the person [was] not consenting or might not be
consenting . . .’. The quoted fault element set out in subs. (ii) was added by virtue
of the Crimes Amendment (Rape) Act 2007 (Vic).
2 Section 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) is the statutory version of rape in Victoria.
It must be read in conjunction with ss 35–37, which provide relevant definitions,
deeming provisions and rules governing jury instructions or the lack thereof in rape
prosecutions.
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37AA and 37AAA of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)3 which mandate that
juries receive various directions in rape prosecutions, and particularly so
when the accused alleges that he or she acted with an honest belief that
the complainant was consenting to the sexual penetration in question.4
Although these and other changes instituted by the 2007 Act have
engendered their fair share of criticism,5 for present purposes the Act is
merely intended to serve as a backdrop against which the High Court’s
decision in The Queen v Getachew6 will be viewed. It is the writer’s view
that the intent and impact of both the Act and Getachew are to erode the
effect the House of Lords’ decision in DPP v Morgan,7 a decision that,
until Getachew, had been reaffirmed time and again in a long line of
decisions of the Victorian Court of Appeal8 and other appellate courts.9
The longstanding precept enunciated in Morgan will be discussed
below.
DPP v Morgan
In DPP v Morgan,10 the accused and three others were convicted of
raping his wife. The accused had enticed the others to partake in the
crime by informing them, prior to the incident, that she was a bit ‘kinky’
and would likely struggle and protest as a means of becoming sexually
aroused.11 For the purposes of this article, the key issue raised on appeal
was whether the trial judge erred in directing the jury that if the accused
acted with an honest and reasonable belief that the complainant was
consenting, this would preclude the jury from finding that the accused
had acted with the requisite mens rea for the common law offence of
rape, thereby resulting in an acquittal. The House of Lords opined that
3 The Queen v Getachew [2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196 at [18], [20].
4 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s. 37AA.
5 See, e.g., K. J. Arenson, ‘Ignorance of the Law as a Defence to Rape: The
Destruction of a Maxim’ (2012) 76 JCL 336 (criticising the Victorian Court of
Appeal for eviscerating DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 by construing s. 37AA of the
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) as leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact
that the accused acted with an awareness that the complainant’s consent was
lacking under the deeming provisions set out in s. 36 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic));
K. J. Arenson, ‘Rape in Victoria as a Crime of Absolute Liability: A Departure from
Both Precedent and Progressivism’ (2012) 76 JCL 389 (arguing that the principle
enunciated in Morgan was also eviscerated as a consequence of the Crimes
Amendment (Rape) Act 2007 (Vic) which, in many instances, effectively permits
Victoria’s statutory offence of rape to be prosecuted as one of absolute liability).
6 [2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196.
7 DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182.
8 The Morgan principle was adopted by the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Saragozza
[1984] VR 187 and reaffirmed by the court in a more recent series of decisions: R v
Zilm [2006] VSCA 72 (5 April 2006); Worsnop v The Queen [2010] VSCA 188 (28
July 2010); Roberts v The Queen [2011] VSCA 162 (2 June 2011); Neal v The Queen
[2011] VSCA 172 (15 June 2011); and Wilson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 328 (27
October 2011).
9 See, e.g., R v Satnam (1983) 78 Cr App 149; R v Kimber [1983] 1 WLR 1118
(extending the Morgan principle to charges of indecent assault); R v Brown (1975)
10 SASR 139.
10 DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182.
11 Ibid. at 206.
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the requisite mens rea is an intention to have carnal knowledge12 of the
complainant without her consent13—meaning that the accused in-
tended to have carnal knowledge of the complainant without her con-
sent while aware that she was not or might not be consenting to the
sexual act.14 In cases such as this in which a common law or statutory
offence requires proof that the accused acted with a particular state of
mind, this mental state is commonly referred to as the mens rea element
of the offence which, like all other elements, must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the fact-finder.15
In writing for the majority, Lord Hailsham explained that a genuine
belief that the complainant is consenting to carnal knowledge and the
aforementioned mens rea are mutually exclusive of one another.16 His
Lordship then opined that this is true regardless of whether or not the
putative belief in consent would have been entertained by a reasonable
person in the position of the accused.17 Lord Hailsham added, however,
that the reasonableness or lack thereof of the belief is not devoid of
relevance in rape prosecutions. To the contrary, the reasonableness of
the accused’s putative belief is a circumstance to be taken into account
by the fact-finder in determining whether it was genuinely held.18
Upon first impression, it is difficult to find fault with Lord Hailsham’s
reasoning. If one engages in carnal knowledge of a woman without her
consent or assists or encourages others to do so in the belief that she is
giving her free and conscious permission to the sexual penetration at
issue, how does one reconcile that belief with the mens rea element of
the common law offence of rape which mandates that the accused must
12 At common law, carnal knowledge is defined as any amount of penile penetration
of the vaginal cavity, however slight, and no emission of seminal fluid is required:
Holland v The Queen (1993) 67 ALJR 946.
13 At common law, consent is defined as free and conscious permission: R v Wilkes and
Bryant [1965] VR 475 at 480. Thus, if the complainant accedes to sexual
penetration out of force, fear of force or any other type of harm, no consent has
been given.
14 DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 208–9.
15 K. J. Arenson and M. Bagaric, Rules of Evidence in Australia: Text and Cases, 2nd edn
(LexisNexis: 2007) 14–16, 21, 26.
16 DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 208–9. Under s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic),
Victoria’s statutory offence of rape, there are three methods by which rape can be
committed. All required the same mens rea as the common law offence of rape until
the advent of the Crimes Amendment (Rape) Act 2007 (Vic) which, in the case of
two of the three methods, added an additional ‘fault element’ that permitted
conviction upon proof that the accused gave no thought as to whether the
complainant was not or might not have been consenting: The Queen v Getachew
[2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196 at [27]. The Morgan principle would clearly
apply as well to the new fault element.
17 R v Moran [1976] AC 182 at 210.
18 Ibid. at 214. See above n. 8. These Victorian Court of Appeal decisions, unlike
Morgan, dealt with the statutory crime of rape under s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958
(Vic) which supplanted the common law crime of rape that existed in Victoria prior
to 1981. While the basic principle of Morgan was reaffirmed in each of these
decisions, it should be noted that unlike the general common law definition of
consent or the lack thereof set out above in n. 13, s. 36 of the Crimes Act 1958
(Vic) appears to provide a finite list of circumstances in which consent is deemed to
be lacking: Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 November 1991,
1998 (Jim Kennan, Attorney-General); Victorian Law Reform Commission, Rape:
Reform of Law and Procedure, Report No. 43 (1991) para. 12.
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intend to penetrate19 the complainant sexually without her consent
while aware that she is not or might not be consenting? This reasoning
applies with equal force to rape prosecutions brought under s. 38 of the
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).20 This brings us to the question of the extent to
which the High Court’s decision in Getachew has altered the long-
standing precept enunciated in Morgan. Perhaps the more important
question is whether the impact of Getachew should be viewed as a
salutary or inimical development in the eternal quest for consistency
and fairness in the system of criminal justice.
The High Court’s decision in The Queen v Getachew
In The Queen v Getachew21 the accused was convicted of rape under
s. 38(2)(a) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) despite his insistence that he had
never sexually penetrated the complainant.22 Although no evidence was
adduced that the accused acted with a belief that the complainant was
consenting to the alleged sexual penetration, the accused appealed on
the basis that the trial judge had erred in failing to direct the jury that it
was incumbent upon the prosecution to satisfy the jury beyond reason-
able doubt that the accused did not act in the belief that the complainant
was consenting to the same.23 In accepting the accused’s submission, the
Victorian Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction
and ordered a new trial.24 The High Court then granted the prosecution’s
request for special leave to appeal.25
In writing for the court, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell
JJ began with an exposition of the Victorian legislation that replaced the
common law offence of rape with the more complex statutory version
that now exists.26 The court noted that the current statutory offence of
rape, as with other sexual offences in Victoria, must be construed in light
of the general provisions set forth in subdivision 8 of Division 1 of Part
1 which consist of ss 35–37B of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).27 Rape, as




(2) A person commits rape if—
(a) he or she intentionally sexually penetrates another person with-
out that person's consent—
19 It is important to note that at common law, acts of forcible sodomy do not fall
within the classification of rape for the reason that they involve penetration of
orifices other than the vaginal cavity. Therefore, by definition, they do not
constitute carnal knowledge of a woman, the very essence of the offence of rape at
common law.
20 [2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196; see above n. 16 for a discussion of the mens
rea elements of s. 38.
21 [2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196.
22 Ibid. at [4].
23 Ibid. at [6].
24 Ibid at [8].
25 Ibid. at [9].
26 Ibid. at [10]–[19].
27 Ibid. at [10].
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(i) while being aware that the person is not consenting or might
not be consenting; or
(ii) while not giving any thought to whether the person is not
consenting or might not be consenting; or
(b) after sexual penetration he or she does not withdraw from a
person who is not consenting on becoming aware that the person is
not consenting or might not be consenting.
(3) A person (the offender) also commits rape if he or she compels a
person—
(a) to sexually penetrate the offender or another person, irrespective
of whether the person being sexually penetrated consents to the act;
or
(b) who has sexually penetrated the offender or another person, not
to cease sexually penetrating the offender or that other person,
irrespective of whether the person who has been sexually pene-
trated consents to the act.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), a person compels another person
(the victim) to engage in a sexual act if the person compels the victim
(by force or otherwise) to engage in that act—
(a) without the victim’s consent; and
(b) while—
(i) being aware that the victim is not consenting or might not be
consenting; or
(ii) not giving any thought to whether the victim is not consent-
ing or might not be consenting.
Section 36 of the Act provides a statutory definition of consent as well as
a list of circumstances in which the complainant’s consent will be
deemed as lacking. That section provides:
36. Meaning of consent
(1) For the purposes of Subdivisions (8A) to (8D) consent means free
agreement. Circumstances in which a person does not freely agree to an
act include the following—
(a) the person submits because of force or the fear of force to that
person or someone else;
(b) the person submits because of the fear of harm of any type to that
person or someone else;
(c) the person submits because she or he is unlawfully detained;
(d) the person is asleep, unconscious, or so affected by alcohol or
another drug as to be incapable of freely agreeing;
(e) the person is incapable of understanding the sexual nature of the
act;
(f) the person is mistaken about the sexual nature of the act or the
identity of the person;
(g) the person mistakenly believes that the act is for medical or
hygienic purposes.
In commenting on the effect of s. 36, the court made the following
observation:
The 2007 Act made other important changes to the law that took account
of the recommendations made by the 2004 Victorian Law Reform Commis-
sion report. But not all of the recommendations made by that report were
The Queen v Getachew: Rethinking DPP v Morgan
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reflected in amendments made after the report was published. In particu-
lar, neither the 2007 Act nor any of the earlier amendments gave effect to
the recommendation . . . that what was called ‘[t]he defence of honest
belief in consent’ not be available ‘where . . . one or more of the circum-
stances listed in section 36(a)–(g) existed and the accused was aware of the
existence of such circumstances’. Instead, the accused’s awareness of the
existence of such a circumstance was treated, in the amendments made by
the 2007 Act, as a matter about which a trial judge was required to direct
the jury. The required direction was that the jury should consider the
accused's awareness of the s 36 circumstance in deciding whether the
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was
aware that the complainant was not or might not be consenting to the
sexual act.28
Against this background, the court then turned to the new version of s.
37 that was enacted as part of the 2007 Act.29 Section 37 provides:
37. Jury directions
(1) If relevant to the facts in issue in a proceeding the judge must direct
the jury on the matters set out in sections 37AAA and 37AA.
(2) A judge must not give to a jury a direction of a kind referred to in
section 37AAA or 37AA if the direction is not relevant to the facts in issue
in the proceeding.
(3) A judge must relate any direction given to the jury of a kind referred
to in section 37AAA or 37AA to—
(a) the facts in issue in the proceeding; and
(b) the elements of the offence being tried in respect of which the
direction is given—
so as to aid the jury’s comprehension of the direction. (emphasis added)
The court then focused on the purpose and effect of s. 37AA.30 That
section states that
[f]or the purposes of section 37, if evidence is led or an assertion is made
that the accused believed that the complainant was consenting to the
sexual act, the judge must direct the jury that in considering whether the
prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was
aware that the complainant was not consenting or might not have been
consenting, the jury must consider—
(a) any evidence of that belief; and
(b) whether that belief was reasonable in all the relevant circumstances
having regard to—
(i) in the case of a proceeding in which the jury finds that a circum-
stance specified in section 36 exists in relation to the complainant,
whether the accused was aware that that circumstance existed in
relation to the complainant; and
(ii) whether the accused took any steps to ascertain whether the
complainant was consenting or might not be consenting, and if so,
the nature of those steps; and
(iii) any other relevant matters.31
28 Above, n. 21 at [17] (footnote omitted).
29 Ibid. at [19].
30 Ibid. at [20].
31 Ibid.
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In commenting on s. 37AA, the court said that it deals with ‘the
relationship between an accused’s asserted belief that the complainant
was consenting and his or her awareness that the complainant was not or
might not be consenting’.32 The court then added that s. 37AA, when
read in conjunction with s. 37, required s. 37AA directions to be given
whenever ‘evidence is led or an assertion is made that the accused
believed that the complainant was consenting to the sexual act’.33
Although the court ultimately allowed the prosecution’s appeal on the
basis that no such evidence was led or assertion made that required a s.
37AA direction,34 it is nonetheless true that the court’s judgment in
Getachew is of great importance because of its obiter dicta comments
which, if subsequently applied, would effectively overrule the long-
standing Morgan precept that an accused’s belief that the complainant is
consenting to carnal knowledge or sexual penetration is mutually ex-
clusive with the requisite mens rea for rape at common law and s. 38 of
the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) respectively; namely, an awareness that the
complainant is not or might not be consenting to the relevant carnal
knowledge or sexual penetration at issue.35 Thus, the court was of the
view that a genuine belief in consent is not necessarily an answer to rape
if the belief accepts or encompasses the possibility that the complainant
might not be consenting (emphasis added).
In further illuminating this point, the following passages from the
court’s judgment in Getachew are most instructive:
Reference to an accused holding the belief that the complainant was
consenting invites close attention to what was the accused's state of mind.
It was said in the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill for the
2007 Act that ‘belief in consent and awareness of the possibility of an
absence of consent are not mutually exclusive’. So much may be accepted
if ‘belief in consent’ is treated as encompassing a state of mind where the
accused accepts that it is possible that the complainant might not be
consenting.
For present purposes, it is enough to notice that, if an accused asserted,
or gave evidence at trial, that he or she thought or ‘believed’ the complain-
ant was consenting, the prosecution may yet demonstrate to the requisite
standard either that the accused was aware that the complainant might not
be consenting or that the asserted belief was not held. It is to be recalled
32 Abopve, n. 21 (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that the additional fault element
(mens rea) added by the 2007 Act is satisfied by proving that the accused gave no
thought whatever as to whether the complainant was not or might not have been
consenting: s. 38(2)(a)(ii) and (4)(b)(ii). As pointed out above at n. 16, the Morgan
principle would apply equally to the new fault element because an honest belief
that the complainant is not or might not be consenting cannot be reconciled with
giving no thought as to whether the complainant is not or might not be consenting.
33 The Queen v Getachew [2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196 at [20].
34 Ibid. at [29]–[37].
35 Ibid. at [26] and [27]; DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 208–9. It was further held in
Morgan that so long as a genuine belief in consent was in fact held by the accused, it
was unnecessary for the accused to also satisfy the fact-finder that the belief would
have been held by a reasonable person in the same position as the accused: at
228–9. As noted above, however, the reasonableness of the belief is an important
factor that may be taken into account by the fact-finder in determining whether the
putative belief was in fact held: The Queen v Getachew [2012] HCA 10, ( 2012) 286
ALR 196 at [24].
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that, since the 2007 Act, the fault element of rape has been identified as the
accused being aware that the complainant was not or might not be con-
senting or the accused not giving any thought to whether the complainant
was not or might not be consenting. The reference to an accused's aware-
ness that the complainant might not be consenting is, of course, important.
An accused’s belief that the complainant may have been consenting, even
probably was consenting, is no answer to a charge of rape. It is no answer
because each of those forms of belief demonstrates that the accused was
aware that the complainant might not be consenting or, at least, did not
turn his or her mind to whether the complainant might not be
consenting.36
As the pertinent mens rea for rape at common law and under s. 38 of the
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) requires knowledge or awareness37 as opposed to
a mere belief that the complainant is not or might not be consenting, it
is apparent that the foregoing obiter dicta cannot be reconciled with the
principle enunciated in Morgan. Thus, a clear understanding of the
elusive distinction between the mens reas of knowledge and belief is
critical to an understanding of the above-quoted passages from Getachew.
This distinction was succinctly addressed by Professor Peter Gillies in his
treatise, Criminal Law:
There is a clear conceptual distinction between knowledge and belief. ‘Belief’
as opposed to ‘knowledge’ may be used to refer to that state of mind in
which D holds a fact to be true, but is not entirely free from doubt, while
knowledge strictly . . . denotes the situation where D does not, having
regard to the facts known to D, have any doubts as to the existence of the
fact in issue. In many instances it will be difficult to have knowledge in its
strictest sense, as opposed to belief—D cannot even be absolutely con-
fident, for example, that D was born on the day shown on D’s birth
certificate. Nevertheless, D will regard herself or himself as ‘knowing’ this
date . . . In practice, therefore, there will frequently be little difference
between situations of ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’.38
By definition, therefore, the mens rea of belief denotes a state of mind in
which the accused entertains some degree of doubt as to the existence of
whatever fact or circumstance that he or she is required to believe
according to the common law or statutory definition of the offence.
Thus, if a person acts or omits to act (where there is a legal duty to act)
with an honest belief as distinguished from knowledge or awareness39 as
to the existence of a fact or circumstance that makes his or her conduct
criminal, he or she is acting with an acceptance or contemplation that
there is some degree of doubt as to the existence of that fact or circum-
stance. In legal parlance, that acceptance or contemplation is a mens rea
36 Above, n. 33 at [26] and [27].
37 P. Gillies, Criminal Law, 4th edn (LBC: 1997) 72.
38 Ibid. For cases drawing this distinction, see R v Quillerat [1962] Tas SR 370; Fallon v
R (1981) 4 A Crim R 411 at 413, 425, 431; R v Parker [1974] 1 NSWLR 14; R v
Smith (1977) 64 Cr App R 217.
39 Gillies, above n. 37 at 67–8, 72.
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that is commonly referred to as recklessness.40 As the requisite mens rea
for rape at common law and under s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)41
is knowledge or awareness that the complainant is not or might not be
consenting (recklessness), it is apparent that an accused’s belief that the
complainant was consenting will not necessarily suffice to preclude the
prosecution from proving that mens rea.
Eight months subsequent to the High Court’s rather significant obiter
dicta comments in Getachew, the Victorian Court of Appeal transformed
that discussion into legally binding precedent by expressly rejecting the
applicant’s claim, predicated on the Morgan precept, that if the jury
accepted his claim that he had acted in the belief that the complainant
was consenting to the sexual penetration, this would have precluded it
from finding that the mens rea for rape had been proven, thereby
necessitating an acquittal.42 Expressly citing the High Court’s obiter dicta
in Getachew, the Court of Appeal echoed the High Court’s pronounce-
ment that an honestly held belief in consent and an awareness that the
complainant was not or might not be consenting, or gave no thought
whatever to the same, are not mutually exclusive.43 In writing for the
Court of Appeal, Nettle, Redlich and Osborn JJA opined:
Directions along those lines may well have been desirable to provide the
jury with further assistance. We note that, since the Victorian Criminal
Charge Book was revised following the High Court’s decision in Getachew, it
has included the following suggested directions concerning an accused’s
belief in consent:
There is a difference between a belief in consent which [the accused]
relies upon and an awareness that [the complainant] was not or might
not be consenting, which is what this element is about. That is because
there are different strengths of belief.
● At one end of the scale, I might have a belief as to something and the
strength of that belief leaves no possibility for error.
● At the other end of the scale, I can have a belief as to something while
being aware that I might be mistaken. For example, I might believe that
I parked my car on the fourth level of a car park, but I’m aware that it
40 R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464; Boughey v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 10. See also
Gillies, above n. 37 at 59-67. Recklessness is regarded as a form of negligence and,
therefore, denotes conduct on the part of the accused that falls below the standard
of care that all persons must exercise in order to protect their neighbours from
unreasonable risks of harm. Moreover, recklessness is a form of negligence that is
regarded as aggravated negligence in the sense that it involves advertent as opposed
to inadvertent unreasonable risk-taking conduct; that is to say that recklessness
envisages situations in which the accused, though aware of the particular risk
involved, nonetheless opts to proceed despite that awareness. Thus, when a person
acts in the belief of the existence of facts or circumstances that make his or her
conduct criminal, it is also true that he or she has acted with recklessness
concerning those facts or circumstances, provided that his or her overall conduct
falls below the standard of care that amounts to negligence.
41 See discussion above in nn. 16 and 32, however, which allude to a new fault
element in s. 38 that was added by the Crimes Amendment (Rape) Act 2007 (Vic)
and to which the Morgan principle would also apply.
42 NT v The Queen [2012] VSCA 213 (6 September 2012) at [11]–[12].
43 Ibid. at [12]–[13], citing The Queen v Getachew [2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196
at [26]–[27].
The Queen v Getachew: Rethinking DPP v Morgan
159
might be on the third level. I then go to the fourth level to find my car,
even though I’m aware it might not be there.
In order to prove this element of awareness, the prosecution must prove
to you that [the accused] did not have such a strong belief that [the
complainant] was consenting that he did not think of the possibility
that she might not be consenting. In determining the strength of [the
accused’s] belief in consent, you should consider the matters I just
mentioned that are relevant to whether the belief was held. This in-
cludes any evidence of the belief, whether the accused was aware that,
[describe relevant s. 36 or 37AAA(d) or (e) circumstances], whether the
accused took steps to find out whether the complainant was consenting
and any other relevant factors.
We consider it desirable that a jury be told the following. There is a
difference between the state of mind of belief in consent and awareness
that the complainant might not be consenting. It is for the prosecution to
establish that the accused did not have a belief in consent that creates a
reasonable doubt that he was aware that the complainant was not or might
not be consenting. Whether the belief does create a doubt will depend
upon the jury’s findings of fact as to the nature and extent of that
belief.44
Although the Court of Appeal spoke of what it termed ‘belief’45 at
opposite ends of a scale that is based upon the degree of strength with
which a belief is held, the writer’s view is that a belief that is held with
such strength that it leaves no room for the possibility of doubt is
nothing more than a convoluted description of the state of mind (mens
rea) known as knowledge or awareness.46 Whether one chooses to
characterise such a state of mind as knowledge/awareness or the type of
belief described by the Court of Appeal above, it is clear that either state
of mind, if found by a jury to have been held by the accused at the time
of the alleged sexual penetration, would preclude a finding that the
accused possessed the necessary mens rea for rape and, therefore, result
in an acquittal.
On the other hand, a state of mind (mens rea) that accepts or con-
templates the possibility of error, however slight, is descriptive of the
state of mind known as ‘belief’.47 This state of mind falls short of the
requisite knowledge or awareness that the complainant is not or might
not be consenting. To the contrary, a mere belief in consent which, by
definition, accepts or contemplates the possibility or perhaps an even
greater likelihood that the complainant might not be consenting, is
tantamount to the mens rea required for rape at common law and under
s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic); namely, knowledge or awareness that the
complainant is not or might not be consenting (recklessness). The literal
wording of the above-quoted passages from NT, when read in conjunc-
tion with Getachew, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the Morgan
principle which has been reaffirmed by the High Court of Australia,
44 NT v The Queen [2012] VSCA 213 (6 September 2012) at [15] and [16] (footnote
omitted).
45 Ibid. at [16].
46 Gillies, above n. 37.
47 Ibid.
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Victorian Court of Appeal and other appellate courts on numerous
occasions in recent years,48 has now been abolished under the current
Australian common law doctrine.
It would be easy to succumb to the temptation to be dismissive of
what appears to be the sudden demise of DPP v Morgan by pointing out
that the Morgan principle was predicated on an egregious failure to
distinguish properly between the disparate mens reas of knowledge/
awareness and belief. Although hindsight is always 20/20, the fact is that
in many, if not most instances, there is a very tenuous distinction
between these closely related but distinct mens reas.49 In fact, there is a
cogent argument to be made that the distinction between the two is, in
many instances, more metaphysical than real. Even the most pedestrian
minds are aware that history has demonstrated time and again that
things once believed to transcend the capabilities of mankind are now
achievable as a result of advancements in science and technology. For
this reason and other innumerable vicissitudes that are commonplace
such as extraordinary coincidences, the sudden and untimely death or
illness of living creatures and instances of extremely good or bad luck,
we often hear the familiar refrain that ‘anything is possible’, or so it
appears.
Conclusion
The point of this discussion is that there is often a thin, but clearly
discernible, line between a strongly held belief and a belief that excludes
any possibility of error. The principle enunciated in Morgan appeared to
48 R v Saragozza [1984] VR 187; R v Zilm [2006] VSCA 72 (5 April 2006); Worsnop v
The Queen [2010] VSCA 188 (28 July 2010); Roberts v The Queen [2011] VSCA 162
(2 June 2011); Neal v The Queen [2011] VSCA 172 (15 June 2011); Wilson v The
Queen [2011] VSCA 328 (27 October 2011); R v Satnam (1983) 78 Cr App 149; R v
Kimber [1983] 1 WLR 1118; R v Brown (1975) 10 SASR 139.
49 The difficulty in drawing this distinction is highlighted by the fact that although
Morgan came under attack from the day it was decided, critics failed to seize upon
this now apparent oversight. For criticisms of the Morgan principle, see R v Taylor
(1985) 80 Cr App 327; R v Haughian (1985) 80 Cr App 334 (which held that there
was no requirement upon judges to give a direction in the terms of the Morgan
principle where the circumstances of the case and considerations of fairness
weighed against such a direction). See also V. J. Dettmar, ‘Culpable Mistake in
Rape: Eliminating the Defence of Unreasonable Mistake of Fact as to Victim
Consent’ (1985) 89 Dickinson Law Review 473; D. F. Alexander, ‘Twenty Years of
Morgan: A Criticism of the Subjectivist Views of Mens Rea and Rape in Great Britain’
(1995) 7 Pace International Law Review 207; W. Larcombe, ‘Worsnop v The Queen:
Subjective Belief in Consent Prevails (Again) in Victoria’s Pare Law’ (2011) 35
Melbourne University Law Review 697 (a case note criticising the Victorian Court of
Appeal for failing to implement changes to the Morgan principle following statutory
reforms passed in 2007). Perhaps the most poignant criticism of Morgan has been
that it can result in the acquittal of those who, for example, become so inebriated
of their own free will that they act with a state of mind that is mutually exclusive
of the mens rea for rape. This argument has considerable appeal because it is only
due to the accused’s irresponsible conduct that he or she is found to have held a
state of mind that was mutually exclusive with the necessary mens rea. This
argument is further exacerbated by the particularly hideous nature of rape as an
offence and the practical certainty that the complainant will suffer irreparable
emotionally scarring.
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be sound because judges, practitioners and academics accepted it un-
critically and seized upon the folly of failing to draw what has turned out
to be an important distinction between knowledge/awareness and be-
lief. Yet in hindsight, both Getachew and NT have correctly pointed out
that the distinction between knowledge/awareness and belief is not a
mere formality, but one that upon careful examination has literally
forced the courts to rethink the Morgan principle. The result of this
rethinking process is that the Morgan principle has been reshaped rather
than abrogated in its entirety. While it is no longer true that a genuinely
held belief in consent and the mens rea for rape are mutually exclusive,50
it is correct to state that as a consequence of the decisions of the High
Court of Australia and Victorian Court of Appeal in Getachew and NT
respectively, knowledge (or awareness) of consent and the mens rea for
rape are mutually exclusive. This rather mundane proposition can be
applied with the consistency that, in turn, creates both the reality and
appearance of fairness that our adversarial system of criminal justice
demands.
50 In fact, it can now be said that a person who acts with an honest belief as opposed
to knowledge/awareness of consent is, by definition, someone who possesses the
requisite mens rea for rape at common law and under s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958
(Vic).
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